The Costs—or Have There Been Benefits, Too?—of Sprawl
by Alex Krieger

In the growing literature on sprawl, a predominant view holds urban sprawl accountable for much that is wrong with urban America. This is the view of New Urbanists, among others, who consider sprawl a recent and aberrant form of urbanization that threatens even the American Dream. Such is the thesis of the oft-cited Suburban Nation: The Rise of Sprawl and the Decline of the American Dream (2000) by Andreas Duany, Elizabeth Plater-Zyberk and Jeff Speck, and of their West Coast counterparts Peter Calthorpe and William Fulton in The Regional City: Planning for the End of Sprawl (2001).

A second view—today less often expressed by planners or the media—is that the effort to control sprawl is an elitist attack on the American Dream, an attack that withholds that dream from those who are still trying to fulfill it. Its current spokesmen are libertarians and others opposed to further government restrictions on property rights.

While opposition to sprawl is growing, the motivations for this opposition are complex and occasionally contradictory. And while support for, or acquiescence to, sprawl generally comes from those fighting to maintain unencumbered property rights, their reassertion of the benefits of sprawl—benefits that motivated most American land development in the first place—cannot be so easily dismissed.

But what constitutes sprawl? That simple word carries the burden of representing the highly complex set of effects from low-density urban expansion. Humanity is still urbanizing with cities worldwide spreading outward at unprecedented rates, but in North America, sprawl, though not literally synonymous with suburbanization, generally refers to suburban-style, auto-dominated, zoned-by-use development spread thinly over a large territory, especially in an “untidy” or “irregular” way. Among the oldest and most persistent critiques of American urban sprawl centers on this visual awkwardness and conjures up an image of the human body sprawling.

Mainstream media attention to sprawl, more than citizen attention, has increased dramatically in recent years. Indeed, in the two-years that straddled the Millennium, sprawl was the subject of lengthy articles in such publications as the Atlantic Monthly, Harper’s, National Geographic, Scientific American, and Time, and of several front-page stories in USA Today—an impressive attention to land-use by media that generally ignore the subject. Scores of other “something-must-be-done-about-sprawl” features, including two Ted Koppel Nightline shows, appeared during the period. Preservation Magazine even chimed in with a long essay on “Golf Sprawl.” On the heels of (and perhaps because of) a decade of prosperity, and as Americans faced a new century, the media identified sprawl as that condition of urbanization that was producing—and if allowed to continue would rapidly accelerate—an erosion in Americans’ quality of life. A seductive sound bite to counter sprawl also continued to gain prominence: “Smart Growth.” Around this mantra gather environmentalists, proponents of urban reinvestment, advocates of social equity, preservationists, spokesmen for various “livability agendas,” public housing officials, and a few trend-sensitive developers, all rallying against, well, sprawl. At the turn of the millennium, those who consider themselves enlightened about land use and environmental stewardship view sprawl as bad for America.

More recent concerns about security and a weaker economy have shifted public and media attention, but have not relegated discussion of sprawl back to planning journals. Indeed, one of the worries among city advocates immediately following the events of September 11, 2001, was a potential re-acceleration of suburbanization—of people and businesses seeking “safer” places to live and work than terrorist-target areas like Manhattan. This reaction, perhaps
over-reaction, has a precedent during the Cold War when the threat of nuclear holocaust produced similar concerns, launching campaigns for “defensive dispersion.” In the late 1940s and early 1950s, planning journals (and scientific journals like Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists) regularly published articles like “The Dispersal of Cities as a Defensive Measure” and “A Program for Urban Dispersal.”

I will return to the arguments periodically made on behalf of sprawl. But what are the arguments against it? There are five principal lines of critique:
The first and oldest is aesthetic, though not often recognized as such. Recall the “ticky-tacky houses” folk songs of the 1960s and, earlier still, the damning words of a poet, relevant still three-quarters of a century later: “I think I shall never see/A billboard lovely as a tree/Perhaps, unless the billboards fall/I’ll never see a tree at all.” While there is a trace of ecological concern in these lines by Ogden Nash, for many, even those lacking poetic sensibilities, the physical environments produced by miles of low-density settlement are simply ugly. They disfigure and insult both nature and worthier examples of human artifice. Among the most effective tactics used by New Urbanists is to simply produce images of prettier environments—recalling the charms but never the limitations of old small towns. Such Currier & Ives vignettes of the future (rather than, as the originals portrayed, of scenes of rapidly disappearing vernacular traditions) help persuade some that the character of places vanished can be recovered to replace the visual chaos of the contemporary suburban landscape. Whether the dressing up of the suburb in town-like iconography can actually diminish sprawl remains to be proven. It seems unlikely that more attractive or even more compact, subdivisions would significantly reduce Americans’ appetite for roaming far and wide in search of either necessities or amusements.

The second argument is sociological. Already in the 1950s, critics like William H. Whyte and John Keats portrayed suburban life as conformist, drab and isolationist. In the decades since, such arguments have expanded to suggest correlation between suburbanization and social apathy, intolerance of neighbors unlike oneself, segregation, and so forth. Concerns are voiced about alienated suburban youth, dependent on parent chauffeurs to get anywhere, about the enslavement of parents to their chauffeur role, and about the isolation of grandparents who can no longer drive themselves. Apprehension about the social isolation of suburban stay-at-home moms has gradually shifted to sociologists’ worry about the difficulties of combining careers and child rearing across a dispersed landscape. The title of Robert Putnam’s recently popular Bowling Alone implies that privation of group activity is also a consequence of lives spent in sprawled, disconnected America, although Putnam could draw only circumstantial correlation between sprawl and a decline in civic engagement.

The third critique is environmental and remains the most compelling. This critique has slowly (far too slowly for some) gained power since the late ’60s and early ’70s when Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring, Ian McHarg’s Design With Nature, the first Earth Day, and publications such as The Limits to Growth and The Costs of Sprawl helped arouse profound concern about human abuses of the environment. Although worldwide environmental degradation has many causes, sprawl is certainly a contributor. Few can argue that low-density development does not increase auto emissions, water use, pollution, trash, loss of species habitat, and energy consumption. To cite one example, most pollution of ground water, lakes, streams, and rivers in the United States is caused by runoff that collects various toxins on the high percentage of impervious surfaces, like roads and parking lots, in urbanized regions. The heating and cooling of freestanding homes, with their many exterior walls per capita, requires more energy than attached, denser development. And then there are those immaculate lawns that require ample water and chemicals to maintain. Of course, most such conditions are caused by increasing affluence, not just settlement patterns, though affluence and sprawl are not unrelated. Environmentalists have become among the fiercest critics of sprawl, armed with sobering statistics and demanding reform. The first year-2000 issue of Sierra, the magazine of the Sierra Club, devoted itself entirely to the arrival of what it called “The Green Millennium,” which
various authors said needed to be freer of sprawl.\textsuperscript{5} There is little doubt that calls for better environmental stewardship—leading to legislated restrictions on development—will increase in the coming decades, influencing urbanization patterns considerably.

The fourth argument is that sprawl leads to boring “lifestyles.” In addition to dyed-in-the-wool urbanists (like me), some among the generation of now grown children of Baby Boomers, having being raised in the suburbs, are pining for more convivial surroundings. Precisely what proportion feel this way is hard to establish, but various informal housing preference surveys along with the modest recent rise in demand for downtown housing provides considerable anecdotal evidence. A century ago rural populations were lured to cities mainly by economic opportunity. Now younger adults, less inclined to follow in the footsteps of their suburbia-pioneering parents, seek out the cultural and social stimulation of city life. Think of the sultry allure of New York in the TV series “Sex and the City.” By comparison, where is the action along Boston’s “Technology highway” Route 128 once the day’s work of inventing technologies or investing venture capital is done? Rarely does one find fine dancing or music clubs among the Blockbusters, Burger Kings, and karaoke bars of suburbia. Exoticism is associated with city life among young Americans, even though child rearing years and the accompanying search for better public schools and housing affordability return most to the comforts of suburbia. Though back in the suburbs, young parents maintain their desire for more interesting lives, lamenting how hard these are to assemble amid the sprawl.

The fifth case against sprawl, becoming more prevalent, is self-protection. Outwardly it is waged as a campaign, mostly in affluent communities, against loss of open space and growing traffic congestion. Its underlying stance is less noble, constituting some variation of “don’t harm my lifestyle by replicating the locational decisions I made a few years earlier; your arrival will ruin my lovely neighborhood.” As David Brooks, the author of \textit{Bobos in Paradise}, noted in a recent \textit{New York Times} article about exurban voters, “Even though they often just moved to these places, exurbanites are pretty shameless about trying to prevent more people from coming after them.”\textsuperscript{11} On one level, this is understandable. No one wants one’s access to nature obstructed, or a commute to work lengthened. However, such a “Not In My Back Yard” attitude pushes development away from areas resisting growth, increasing rather than containing sprawl. New subdivisions simply leapfrog to the next exit along the highway, where less expensive land (along with fewer constraints on development) is available. Once settled these newcomers will guard against subsequent encroachers.

While anti-sprawl literature relying on one or more of these positions receives substantial attention, little fanfare accompanied the recent publication of a rare rebuttal. In 2001, Randal O’Toole, expressing views that have traditionally been mainstream—and may, indeed, still be—published \textit{The Vanishing Automobile and Other Urban Myths}, subtitled \textit{How Smart Growth Will Harm American Cities}.\textsuperscript{12} The book’s sensibility seems out of kilter with the times, yet its copiously assembled statistics are impressive, if hard to corroborate.

The book calls many of the core assumptions advanced by the critics of sprawl myths. For example, while Jane Holtz Kay’s \textit{Asphalt Nation}, a characteristic condemnation of sprawl, cites numerous (equally hard to substantiate) statistics about what she calls “the cost of the car culture,” O’Toole asserts that, on a passenger per mile basis, public dollars in support of transit are double what they are for highways.\textsuperscript{13} Determining in precise monetary terms how much our culture subsidizes auto usage is nearly impossible. We certainly favor car usage, and thus, no doubt, support and benefit from some direct and many indirect subsidies. Still, within the narrow terms of how he frames the issue—passenger per mile costs—O’Toole’s makes his point clear: Since most of us use cars and few of us use public transit, the public investment in public transit \textit{per user} is plausibly higher than the public investment \textit{per user} for highways. This doesn’t mean (although O’Toole would so argue) that it is not sound public policy to invest in public transit or raise the cost of driving.
Public subsidy of auto usage is but one of the seventy-three (!) myths that O’Toole identifies in what he calls the “The War Against the Suburbs.” A few other examples: He criticizes the much admired experiment in regional growth management in Portland, Oregon, by pointing out (as others have) the resulting rise in housing costs in the center of the city and the fact that light rail system extensions have reduced the number of neighborhood bus lines. He concludes that both changes disproportionately affect the poor, and he thus questions the social equity arguments advanced by transit proponents and growth boundary advocates. He quantifies the substantial preference that Americans at almost all social and economic levels continue to show for larger homes, less density, more open space, and the personal wealth generation that home-ownership has brought. He debunks the assertion that new highways increase congestion by attracting additional traffic (first claimed by Lewis Mumford in the 1950’s) by pointing out that over the past two decades, while the number of auto miles traveled has nearly doubled, the number of road miles has increased by less than three percent. He has the temerity to suggest that people like to drive, rather than being forced to drive by an absence of alternatives. He points out that less than five percent of the land area of the continental United States is urbanized, so fears of running out of land are premature. He argues that it is density, not dispersion, that causes congestion, offering statistics that the densest American cities have the worst incidence of congestion and often the longest commutes. In a characteristic dig at conventional smart growth wisdom, which supports density and opposes highways, he writes: “The Los Angeles metropolitan area [must be] the epitome of smart growth, as it has the highest density and the fewest miles of freeway per capita of any U.S. urbanized area.”

To anyone whose values or intuitions align with current critiques against sprawl, O’Toole’s conclusions seem either irresponsible or naively contrarian. Of course, the arguments for and against sprawl are not going to be resolved by competing value-laden statistics. As the furious debate fueled by the publication of Bjorn Lomborg’s The Skeptical Environmentalist illustrates, ideology and polemical bias can bend many a statistic. Dismissing O’Toole’s stance, nonetheless, disregards that for much of American history, sprawl (though not called that) was considered progressive, a social good, and a measure of citizens’ economic advancement.

Prior to the concern about population concentrations brought about by the atomic bomb, during the 1930’s for example, President Roosevelt’s Resettlement Administration was committed to sprawl—then called decentralization. It was seen as one means for recovering from the Great Depression and preventing similar economic setbacks in the future. A widely held assumption was that among the causes of the Depression were unwieldy and unmanageable concentrations of commerce, capital, and power. In other words, many concluded that huge unmanageable cities (like New York) were partially to blame.

Two generations earlier, Henry George, writing in Progress and Poverty, predicted that concentration of urban populations would worsen economic inequality. He argued passionately that social inequality was endemic to cities, where overcrowding and land possession by the few perpetuated poverty. His “remedies” were to eliminate all private land ownership (impractical, of course) and to disperse urban populations, so that “The people of the city would thus get more of the pure air and sunshine of the country, and the people of the country more of the economic and social life of the city.” For George’s many followers, and the American advocates of the slightly later Garden City Movement, the road away from inequality led out of cities. This argument echoes even today in the continuing migration from older urban centers of people in search of economic upward mobility.

The affirmation of population decentralization can be traced in a straight intellectual line to America’s founding fathers, in particular to the persuasives Thomas Jefferson. Fearing the consequences of America becoming urban, Jefferson went so far as to invent a land-partitioning policy that he hoped would negate the need for urban concentrations. For Jefferson, cities were
Jefferson’s worries about urbanization seemed prescient to those witnessing the unprecedented urban concentrations of the later part of the 19th and early part of the 20th centuries. At the turn of the 20th century, daily life in New York’s Lower East Side, depicted in Jacob Riis’s photomurals and like the life in London’s slums depicted in Charles Dickens’ novels, offered little hope for improving the human condition. What seemed problematic about contemporary urbanization prior to the mid-20th century (and what remains problematic in much of the developing world) was concentration. And sprawl, although called by various less tarnished names, was advocated as a partial solution.

Thus, by the time the middle class sprawled outside cities in great numbers in the decades following World War II, widespread public optimism about the results prevailed, despite an occasional dissent from a William H. Whyte or a Lewis Mumford. It is eerie now to read Whyte’s 1958 (1!) essay in *Fortune*, entitled “Urban Sprawl,” or John Keats’ 1957 novel *A Crack in the Picture Window*, or Peter Blake’s 1963 *The Suburbs are a Mess* in *The Saturday Evening Post*. Much of the aesthetic and social arguments against sprawl (the ecological perspective arose about a decade later) were already well enumerated, or at least anticipated, a half-century ago. Very few citizens were paying much attention, however. Quite happily, and by the millions, Americans sought out the comforts, spatial expanse, clean air, economic leverage, and novelty of the Levittowns and their various imitations. At mid-20th century, sprawl was considered good for Americans and the nation.

What then has made that optimism (a fulfillment of the Jeffersonian ideal) wane, and has it truly waned? Have Americans actually adjusted their image of the good life and its setting? Are contemporary critics of sprawl that much more eloquent than Lewis Mumford or William Whyte? Hardly. What has changed is the impact on individuals caused by the sprawl of others. What has changed is the quantity of sprawlers and the sheer scale of their sprawling.

In the half-century since 1950, the spread of sprawl has been exponential. Urban populations slightly more than doubled, while the land area used by this population has increased by a factor of four! In the Los Angeles area the factor was seven! Two million acres of farmland and open space have, and are continuing to be, lost to development every year. Cars have multiplied twice as fast as the population. Estimates of the costs of time lost and fuel wasted in traffic range into the billions of dollars per year. Ozone-alert days in sprawled metro areas such as Atlanta or Phoenix have been rising for decades, despite improved auto emissions and other environmental controls. North Americans currently use the equivalent of ten acres of land per capita, whereas less developed countries use approximately one acre per capita.

Such disturbing statistics have only recently countered the complacency of suburbanites, or wannabe ones, who heretofore believed that by simply moving further out they could avoid the personal inconveniences caused by the sprawl. For most Americans it has always been easier to retreat than to repair. This has lead to schizophrenic urbanism—people making new places that evoke old qualities while being oblivious to the consequences of abandoning exemplary places made earlier. This self-perpetuating cycle of American urbanization—disinvestments in settled areas, expanding rings of new development, wasteful consumption of resources, obsolescence, highway congestion, economic (now more than racial) segregation, homogeneity, ugliness, all leading to new cycles of perimeter development—is finally being acknowledged by more of us as self-defeating.

What has begun to rattle Americans is the awareness that once everyone got “out there,” some of the advantages of “getting away” have proven illusive. This, however, does not mean that Americans believe that such advantages are no longer worth pursuing, as Randal O’Toole or *USA Today* remind us. In a recent *USA Today* survey giving people four choices of ideal living circumstances, fifty-one percent chose a 100 year-old farm on ten acres, thirty percent chose a five-bedroom Tudor in the suburbs, 10.5 percent selected a Beverly Hills mansion, and a mere 8.5
percent chose a designer loft in Manhattan. No, Americans have not yet abandoned their sprawling instinct, but they are developing a lower tolerance for the sprawl of their neighbors. This is generally unacknowledged in the waves of anti-sprawl literature (which my wife has labeled “the scrawl about sprawl”).

What must be brought to the fore in the debate over sprawl is this: The benefits of sprawl—for example, more housing for less cost with higher eventual appreciation—still tend to accrue to Americans individually, while sprawl’s cost in infrastructure building, energy generation, pollution mitigation, tends to be borne by society overall. Understanding this imbalance is essential, and seeking ways to adjust to whom and how the costs and benefits of sprawl accrue remains the real challenge. Can political will be developed on behalf of impact fees, user assessments, regional tax-sharing, higher gasoline taxes and highway tolls, streamlined permitting and up-zoning in already developed areas, ceilings on mortgage deductions, surcharges on second homes, open space (and related) amenity assessments, regional transfer-of-development rights, and similar ideas that may shift some of the costs of sprawl onto the sprawlers? There is infrequent evidence of this today but there is hope that growing awareness of sprawl will lead to such policies. Yes, continuing to find new arguments against sprawl is valuable, but the campaign to create a more diverse, rewarding, and environmentally sound urban future will ultimately depend on Americans finding ways to calibrate short-term self-interest with long-term social value.

Alex Krieger is Professor in Practice of Urban Design, Chair of the Department of Urban Planning and Design at Harvard Design School, and a principal at Chan Krieger & Associates, Cambridge.

Notes
ii. The New Oxford American Dictionary definition of sprawl emphasize such ungainly, irregular, awkward conditions.
iv. In 1998 during the early phases of Vice President Al Gore’s presidential bid he published a policy document called “Clinton-Gore Livability Agenda: Building Livable Communities for the 21st Century.” For various reasons (including the supposition that it did not catch on with the electorate) the smart growth part of his campaign became less and less pronounced over the course of the campaign.
v. Ogden Nash, The Pocket Book of Ogden Nash (New York, Little Brown, 1962). By coincidence, 1962 also was the year Malvina Reynolds’ famous folk song, ‘Little Boxes,” “They’re all made out of ticky-tacky, and they all look just the same.”
viii. Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000). Putnam postulated several causes for an increase in civic disengagement, but concluded: “Yet [sprawl] cannot account for more than a small fraction of the decline, for civic disengagement is perfectly visible in smaller towns and rural areas as yet untouched by sprawl” (215).
Curbing sprawl was one of “five bold ideas for the new century” offered in the January/February 2000 issue of Sierra.


Randal O’Toole, The Vanishing Automobile and Other Urban Myths: How Smart Growth Will Harm America (Bandon, OR: Thoreau Institute, 2001)


O’Toole, 392.

Bjørn Lomborg, The Skeptical Environmentalist: Measuring the Real State of the World (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001) and Scientific American, “Misleading Math about the Earth: Science defends itself against The Skeptical Environmentalist,” January 2002. Lomborg’s book, the lengthy critiques published by 4 scientists in Scientific American, and Lomborg’s rebuttal to these critiques unleashed a virtual firestorm of other rebuttals, and an occasional essay in Lomborg’s defense, in scores of popular and scientific environmental journals, and across the Internet that continues to this day.

An often repeated statement attributed to Rexford G. Tugwell, President Roosevelt’s first administrator of the Resettlement Administration spoke directly to the hopes for decentralization: “…to go just outside centers of population, pick up cheap land, build a whole new community and entice people into it. Then go back into the cities and tear down whole slums and make parks of them.” Quoted in Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Roosevelt: The Coming of the New Deal (Boston: 1958) p.370.


Thomas Jefferson often expressed his concerns about a future urbanized America. A typical example is found in a letter to James Madison written in 1787: “I think our government will remain virtuous for many centuries; … as long as there shall be vacant land in any part of America. When they get piled upon one another in large cities, as in Europe, they will become corrupt as in Europe.” Quoted in A. Whitney Griswald, “The Agrarian Democracy of Thomas Jefferson”, The American Political Science Reader, v.XL #4, August 1946, p.668.


One would think that optimism has waned when reading a report such as the Bank of California (along with several environmental and housing advocacy organizations) sponsored “Beyond Sprawl: New Patterns of Growth to fit the New California” first published in 1995 and widely distributed since then. The executive summary begins with the following sentence: “Ironically, unchecked sprawl has shifted from an engine of California’s growth to a force that now threatens to inhibit growth and degrade the quality of life.”
